TEN QUESTIONS ON GAY RIGHTS AND
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Wilson R. Huhn

*

Professor Dent has made careful and thorough arguments against
gay rights.1 His work deserves serious consideration and a serious
response.
Our first task is to clear away the brush, to clarify the issues, to
establish those points upon which Professor Dent and I both agree, so
that we can more clearly understand precisely where we disagree. For
that purpose I have prepared a series of ten questions that will
progressively narrow the issues concerning gay rights and free exercise
rights until we come to the principal point upon which Professor Dent
and I disagree – the definition and application of the principle of
equality.

* B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; C. Blake McDowell, Jr., Professor
of Law, University of Akron School of Law. I dedicate this essay to my sister, Elisabeth, who
exemplifies courage and devotion.
1. See George W. Dent, Jr., “How Does Same-Sex Marriage Threaten You?,” 59 RUTGERS L.
REV. 233 (2007) [hereinafter How Does Same-Sex Marriage Threaten You?]; George W. Dent, Jr.,
Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religious Freedom, 95 KY. L.J. 553 (2007) [hereinafter
Civil Rights for Whom?]. For other recent scholarship on gay rights and freedom of religion, see,
e.g., Ben Schuman, Gods and Gays: Analyzing the Same-Sex Marriage Debate From a Religious
Perspective, 96 GEO. L.J. 2103 (2008); Note, First Amendment – California Supreme Court Holds
That Free Exercise of Religion Does Not Give Fertility Doctors Right to Deny Treatment to
Lesbians. – North Coast Women‟s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior Court,
189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008), 122 HARV. L. REV. 787 (2008).
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TEN QUESTIONS
1. IS THERE A FREE EXERCISE OBJECTION TO THE DECISION IN
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS?2 IN OTHER WORDS, DO THE MAJORITY OF THE
VOTERS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE TO ENACT THEIR RELIGIOUS
BELIEFS INTO LAW?
No. To take such a position would be to confuse the rights of the
individual with the power of the state – it confounds private action with
state action. The difference between private action and state action is of
fundamental constitutional importance.
In this country, individuals have the right to freedom of religion.
As individuals, we have an absolute right to believe whatever we want in
matters of religion.3 But when legislators enact statutes or the voters
enact law by way of referendum, we cross a line from individual action
to state action, and that changes the result under the Constitution,
because the government does not have the right to the Free Exercise of
Religion. To the contrary, the Establishment Clause4 prohibits the
government from acting on religious impulses.5
The Supreme Court expressly and emphatically ruled on this
question in 1963 in the case of School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp.6 In that case, the Court struck down a state law that required
public school officials, at the beginning of each school day, to read

2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas statute making oral or anal intercourse
between people of the same sex a crime).
3. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (“Thus the [First] Amendment
embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be.”).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.”).
5. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (“[T]o withstand
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”).
6. Id. (striking down a state law and a school board rule requiring the reading of Bible
verses or the Lord‟s Prayer in the public schools).
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passages from the Bible to their students.7 Writing for eight justices,
Justice Tom Clark stated: “[w]hile the Free Exercise Clause clearly
prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to
anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of
the State to practice its beliefs.”8
2. IS THERE A FREE EXERCISE OBJECTION TO THE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURTS OF MASSACHUSETTS9 AND CALIFORNIA10 THAT
RECOGNIZED A RIGHT TO SAME SEX MARRIAGE UNDER THEIR STATE
CONSTITUTIONS?

Following the same reasoning set forth above in answer to
question number one, the majority of the people of a State do not have
the right, under the Free Exercise Clause, to enact their beliefs into law.
There may be other reasons advanced for excluding gay and lesbian
couples from the institution of marriage,11 but as Justice O‟Connor stated

7. See id. at 224 (finding the mandatory reading of Bible passages in the public schools to be
a violation of the First Amendment).
8. Id. at 226.
9. Goodridge v. Dep‟t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (finding that the
state may not “deny the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two
individuals of the same sex who wish to marry.”).
10. Press Release, Judicial Council of California, California Supreme Court Rules in Marriage
Cases (May 15, 2008) (http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR26-08.PDF)
(“California legislative and initiative measures limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violate the
state constitutional rights of same-sex couples and may not be used to preclude same-sex couples
from marrying.” (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008))).
11. The principal reason offered by Professor Dent for opposing same sex marriage is the
protection of children. See How Does Same-Sex Marriage Threaten You?, supra note 1, at 240-45.
I agree with Professor Dent that marriage confers substantial benefits on children. In light of this
fact, why would we deny the benefits that legal recognition of the family would confer upon the
children of gay and lesbian couples?
Professor Dent states that gay and lesbian couples must not be permitted to marry because they
cannot produce biological children with each other. See id. at 240-41. Professor Dent states:
If a + b = a, then b = 0. Designate a loving, committed relationship between
two people as "a." Assume that a homosexual relationship is just as likely as
a heterosexual relationship to qualify as such a relationship. Heterosexual
relationships, however, have a second quality which homosexual
relationships lack: the capacity for reproduction. Designate that quality "b."
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in Lynch v. Donnelly,12 the Constitution “requires that a government
activity have a secular purpose.”13 By itself, “conformity with religious
By saying that homosexual and heterosexual relationships are equally
valuable, then, the [New Jersey Supreme Court] is saying that a + b = a, and
that "b," the capacity to reproduce, is worth nothing, valueless.
It is certainly true that gay and lesbian couples cannot create children by means of intercourse. In
this respect they are the same as infertile couples who constitute approximately seven percent of all
married couples. See Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ (last visited Apr. 3,
2009). Furthermore, like infertile couples, gay and lesbian couples can adopt or use reproductive
technology to have children. And, if having children is an indispensable reason for marrying, then
why do we let married couples use birth control? See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(upholding the constitutional right of married couples to use contraception). And why do we allow
couples who are my age (fifty-nine) to get married?
Professor Dent also argues that if gays and lesbians are admitted to the institution of marriage,
heterosexual couples will desert the institution – they will simply not marry. See George W. Dent,
Jr., Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 419, 425-26 (2004) (predicting
that heterosexual couples would lose interest in marriage if same-sex marriage were recognized). I
doubt that would happen. When interracial marriages were recognized in Loving v. Virginia, there
was no overt movement among white racists to abandon the institution of marriage, and I predict
that if same-sex marriages are recognized, people of all beliefs will still seek the economic, legal,
and emotional benefits of state-sanctioned marriage. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has held that the government may not enact laws merely because they reflect the negative
attitudes of people towards an unpopular group. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 448 (1985) (“[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly
cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally
retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like. It is plain that the
electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could not order city action violative of
the Equal Protection Clause, and the City may not avoid the strictures of that Clause by deferring to
the wishes or objections of some fraction of the body politic.” (citation omitted)).
I suspect that the real reason for denying equal marriage rights to gays and lesbians is simply that
same sex marriage does not comport with traditional notions of morality. However, in Lawrence
the Supreme Court found that traditional views of morality are insufficient to justify a law making
gay and lesbian intercourse a crime. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003)
(Kennedy, J.) (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither
history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”
(quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)); id. at 582 (O‟Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Moral
disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to
satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
12. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (upholding the inclusion of a nativity scene as part of a
municipal holiday display).
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doctrine” is not a valid justification to support the enactment of any
law.14
3. DO INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR EMPLOYEES HAVE A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE TO
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST GAYS AND LESBIANS IN GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYMENT OR SERVICES?

If a government official were to fire an employee, dismiss a juror,
or refuse to issue a drivers license to a citizen for religious reasons there
would be a clear-cut violation of the Establishment Clause. As an
individual, a person may exercise the right to freedom of religion but, as
a government official, a person must act in a manner that is neutral with
respect to religion.15

13. Id. at 690 (O‟Connor, J., concurring) (“The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that
a government activity have a secular purpose.”).
14. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The legitimacy of secular
legislation depends instead on whether the State can advance some justification for its law beyond
its conformity to religious doctrine.”).
15. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (stating that the First
Amendment “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (referring to
the “wholesome „neutrality‟” created by the interplay of the Establishment Clause (prohibiting the
government from officially supporting religion) and the Free Exercise Clause (prohibiting the
government from interfering with religious practice)); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844,
860 (2005) (“The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the „First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.‟”
(citations omitted)).
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4. RETURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF OUR FIRST TWO QUESTIONS, WHEN
THE COURTS ISSUE DECISIONS RECOGNIZING THE EQUAL RIGHTS OF
GAYS AND LESBIANS, DO THESE DECISIONS, IN AND OF THEMSELVES,
INTERFERE WITH THE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF ANY INDIVIDUAL OR
ANY PRIVATE BUSINESS THAT BELIEVES HOMOSEXUALITY IS A SIN OR
THAT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A SAME SEX MARRIAGE AS A VALID
MARRIAGE?

No, and for a very simple reason. Individuals and private
organizations are not subject to the dictates of the Constitution.16 No
matter how the Constitution is interpreted, discrimination by private
parties becomes illegal only if the government affirmatively adopts a
nondiscrimination statute.17
The next few questions in this essay explore the issue of whether
nondiscrimination laws are constitutional when they conflict with the
religious beliefs of individuals.

16. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (“Since the decision of this Court in the
Civil Rights Cases, the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the
action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly
be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful.” (citations omitted)).
17. See id. The Court stated: “[w]e conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agreements
standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. For example, if a private employer chose to discriminate on the basis
of race, religion, gender, or sexual orientation, the Constitution would not bar such acts of
discrimination.
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5. DOES EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
18
OF OREGON V. SMITH ESTABLISH THE APPLICABLE STANDARD FOR
EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS UNDER THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE?
The Smith case does indeed establish the standard for the
constitutionality of laws under the Free Exercise Clause. Under Smith,
laws that are not generally applicable19 or that are not neutral with
respect to religion20 are presumed unconstitutional and are subject to the
strict scrutiny test,21 while laws of general application which are not
specifically directed at religious practice are presumed constitutional and
are subject only to the rational basis test.22

18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded in part by statute Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (West 2008) (upholding denial of unemployment compensation based
on violation of state criminal statute prohibiting the use of peyote as applied to members of Native
American Church among whom the ingestion of peyote is a religious sacrament).
19. See id. at 884 (“Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the
unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally
applicable criminal law.” (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (requiring strict scrutiny
in all cases where a law substantially burdens religious practice))).
20. See id. at 877 (“It would be true, we think . . . that a State would be „prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion]‟ if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display.” (alteration in original)).
21. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993) (“In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases establish
the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by
a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular
religious practice. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. Neutrality and
general applicability are interrelated, and, as becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one
requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these
requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored
to advance that interest.”).
22. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (“To make an individual's obligation to obey [a neutral,
generally applicable law] contingent upon the law‟s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except
where the State‟s interest is „compelling‟ – permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, „to become a law
unto himself,‟ – contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.” (citation omitted)).
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6. IS A LAW PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION23
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE? IN OTHER
WORDS, DO INDIVIDUALS AND PRIVATE BUSINESSES HAVE A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE TO
DISCRIMINATE AMONG THEIR EMPLOYEES, CUSTOMERS, OR TENANTS ON
THE BASIS OF RELIGION?
I would contend that laws that forbid discrimination on the basis
of religion are “neutral” with respect to religion and do not specifically
target the exercise of religion. However, even if the courts were to find
that nondiscrimination laws are not “neutral” and that they were subject
to strict scrutiny,24 they would still be found constitutional, because
these laws are necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest –
the interest of the state in removing religious barriers to advancement in
the workplace and the marketplace.25 Businesses do not have a
constitutional right to refuse to hire or serve someone because of their
religion, nor do homeowners have a constitutional right to refuse to sell
their property to someone for the same reason. These nondiscrimination
laws are perfectly constitutional, even though they prohibit individuals
from preferring people of their own religious faith.

23. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2009) (“It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer – to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual‟s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .
. . .”).
24. See Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 546 (“A law burdening religious practice that is not
neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”).
25. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (“[A]cts of invidious
discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause
unique evils that government has a compelling interest to prevent . . . .”).
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7. WHEN A SUPERVISOR REPEATEDLY EXPRESSES DISAPPOINTMENT
CONCERNING A SUBORDINATE‟S ATTENDANCE OR NONATTENDANCE AT
A PARTICULAR CHURCH, COULD THAT BE HELD TO CONSTITUTE
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION?
Findings of employment discrimination based on speech alone,
apart from any discriminatory conduct, present difficult problems under
the First Amendment.26 So long as the coworker‟s speech does not
constitute “fighting words” or “true threats,” it is fully protected under
the First Amendment.27 But, just as no one has the right to disrupt a
classroom, we may also prevent someone from disrupting the workplace.
For example, I cannot be sent to jail merely because I disagree with you
on matters of religion, disparage your beliefs, or persistently seek to
convert you. But if I do these things at work – if I am constantly asking
you to accept Jesus as your Lord and Savior, or Mohammed as the true
Prophet, and particularly if I am a supervisor – then at some point the
law will conclude that I am creating a “hostile environment” for people
of other faiths and that I am guilty of discriminating on the basis of
religion.28 Even by itself speech is capable of creating a hostile

26. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Religious Harassment Law, and Religious
Accommodation Law, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 57 (2001) (calling for greater protection of freedom of
speech under nondiscrimination laws); id. at 69 (disagreeing with the position of the EEOC, stating:
“the government has no business suppressing our ideas, whether religious or political, and whether
or not they are „disparaging‟ (the EEOC's term), are made „for the purpose of exposing [another
religion] to contempt and ridicule‟ (Chandler‟s test), or fail to exhibit adequate sensitivity to
[another‟s] feelings.‟” (footnote omitted) (alterations in original)).
A clearer case is presented when the employer not only proselytizes his employees but treats them
differently based upon their religion. See Cline v. Auto Shop, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. 2000)
(upholding claim of non-believing employee under state law prohibiting discrimination in
employment because of religion when employer conditioned pay raises and work assignments on
attendance at employer‟s church).
27. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding the conviction of the
defendant for uttering “fighting words”); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (upholding statute
prohibiting the burning of a cross with the intent to intimidate other persons).
28. See Volokh, supra note 26, at 58 n.3 (collecting authorities supporting the proposition that
excessive proselytizing constitutes harassment).
Professor Dent cites Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2004) as an example of a case
where an employee‟s religious rights were trampled upon. In that case, a supervisor, Bodett, had
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told a subordinate, Carson, during a performance review that “she would be disappointed if Carson
were dating another woman, but happy if she were dating a man.” See id. at 741; Dent, Civil Rights
for Whom?, supra note 1, at 621-23. The supervisor was fired for violating company policy
prohibiting harassment of other employees on the basis of “race, color, religion, sexual orientation,
national origin, age, disability or veteran status.” Bodett, 366 F.3d at 741. Bodett sued her former
employer for discriminating against her on the basis of religion. See id.at 739-40. The court denied
Bodett‟s claim because she had failed to demonstrate that she had been treated differently than any
other employee would have been treated in making statements of this kind during a performance
review. See id. at 746. Professor Dent also objects to the result in Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004). See Dent, Civil Rights for Whom?, supra note 1, at 624-26. In that
case, in response to a company campaign celebrating diversity and promoting HP‟s official policy
emphasizing the importance of showing respect for fellow employees, Peterson chose to
prominently display Bible verses calling homosexuality an “abomination” and stating that anyone
who commits these acts “shall surely be put to death.” Peterson, 358 F.3d at 601-02. As a result,
the company terminated Peterson‟s employment. See id. at 602. Peterson sued HP on the ground
that HP was discriminating against him on the basis of religion and had failed to make reasonable
accommodation for his religious beliefs. See id. at 601. The court denied Peterson‟s claim, again
on the ground that he was treated no differently than any other employee would have been treated in
making statements of this nature. See id. at 605 (“Peterson offered no evidence . . . that would
support a reasonable inference that his termination was the result of disparate treatment on account
of religion.”). The court also ruled that HP need not accommodate Peterson‟s actions because to do
so would constitute an “undue hardship” on the employer who was seeking to create a positive work
environment. See id. at 608. In objecting to the results in these cases, Professor Dent is essentially
arguing in favor of individual immunity from nondiscrimination laws for religiously-based
expressions of intolerance.
Neither Bodett nor Peterson could claim that their employers violated their constitutional rights to
freedom of expression or freedom of religion because private employers are not subject to the
dictates of the Constitution. See supra notes 16 and 17. Nor is it reasonable to contend that under
the civil rights laws religiously-based expressions of intolerance must be treated differently than
opinions that spring from moral or political considerations. See Volokh, supra note 26, at 59-60
(“[F]rom a Free Speech Clause perspective, religious harassment law stands or falls with racial and
sexual harassment law, and vice versa. If some religiously offensive statements are protected by the
Free Speech Clause, then the same must go for racially or sexually offensive statements.
Conversely, if racial or sexual harassment law is categorically immune from Free Speech Clause
attack, then religious harassment law must trump free speech too.”).
Professor Dent expresses concern that if the results in Bodett and Peterson are followed, then it may
become unlawful for employees to make any statements concerning religion in the workplace; that
even to identify oneself as a Christian, Muslim, or Jew connotes opposition to homosexuality. See
Dent, Civil Rights for Whom?, supra note 1, at 626. I agree with Professor Dent that if an employer
were to fire an employee merely because he or she disclosed his or her religion or posted the Ten
Commandments that this would constitute discrimination on the basis of religion. I disagree with
his suggestion that disclosure of one‟s religion or anything in the Ten Commandments is at all
equivalent to the expressions of intolerance exemplified by Bodett and Peterson.
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environment.29 However, the same law that prohibits discrimination in
the workplace also requires employers to make reasonable
accommodation for their employees‟ religious observance or practice.30
People have the right to express themselves on matters of religion, but
their co-workers also have the right to freedom from harassment.
8. UNDER SMITH, IS A STATE LAW PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION ON THE
BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE?
State laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation are laws of general application and, accordingly, under Smith
they must be evaluated under the rational basis test, not the strict
scrutiny test.31 Under the rational basis test, these kinds of laws are
constitutional so long as they have any tendency to achieve a legitimate
state interest.32

29. See supra note 28.
30. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(j) (West 2009).
31. See North Coast Women‟s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior Court,
189 P.3d 959, 966 (Cal. 2008) (finding the California law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation to be “a valid and neutral law of general applicability” (quoting Dep’t of Human
Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990))); but see Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.
2006) (holding that federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) required application of
“strict scrutiny” of federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act as applied to age discrimination
suit brought by Methodist minister forced to retire at the age of seventy). Ironically, state laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are evaluated under the rational basis
test while, because of RFRA, federal nondiscrimination laws are evaluated under strict scrutiny
when they impose a substantial burden on a person‟s free exercise of religion.
32. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding 1964
Civil Rights Act). The Court stated:
Nor does the Act deprive appellant of liberty or property under the Fifth
Amendment. The commerce power invoked here by the Congress is a
specific and plenary one authorized by the Constitution itself. The only
questions are: (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial
discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis,
whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and
appropriate.
Id. at 258.
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Laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
easily pass the rational basis test. Nondiscrimination laws are adopted to
create a more productive working environment and to make the
maximum use of each person‟s talents and abilities, thus increasing the
productivity of our farms, our factories, our stores, and our professions,
which in turn increases the happiness and well-being of everyone in our
society.33 This clearly satisfies the rational basis test.
9. EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS, LIKE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS,
ADVOCACY GROUPS, AND POLITICAL PARTIES, ENJOY IMMUNITY FROM
NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS. COULD A FOR-PROFIT BUSINESS QUALIFY
AS AN EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION?
Under the First Amendment, expressive associations do not have
to employ persons or allow them to become members if their
employment or membership would interfere with the ability of the
organization to convey its message.34 Accordingly, the Catholic Church
is not required to ordain women as priests,35 the Democratic Party is not
required to allow Republicans to vote in their primaries,36 and the Ku
Klux Klan is not required to admit blacks to membership.37

33. See supra note 25. In Smith, the Court explained why laws of general applicability should
prevail over matters of individual conscience, stating that the “unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself
or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs.” 494 U.S. at 890.
34. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“There can be no clearer example
of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the
group to accept members it does not desire.”).
35. See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding a priest‟s suit against
Catholic diocese under Title VII alleging racial discrimination in employment barred by “ministerial
exception” to Title VII); see also 42 U.S.C.A, § 2000e-1(a) (West 2009) (exempting religious
organizations from the federal law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion).
36. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (holding state law opening
primary elections to voters from other political parties violates the party‟s First Amendment right to
political association).
37. See Ku Klux Klan, The Knights Party, http://www.kkk.bz/howtoget.htm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2009) (“We emphasize ONE requirement for every person who decides to associate with
The Knights, and that is that they conduct themselves with Christian character. We want our
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There are some practical obstacles that a for-profit business
would face in attempting to qualify as an expressive organization. First,
it would be necessary for the organization to express a specific
message.38 If an organization keeps its message secret, it is not an
expressive association. Second, these businesses would be ineligible for
the tax breaks and other benefits accorded nonprofit charitable
organizations,39 a status that religious institutions and advocacy groups
normally consider crucial for their survival. But, most importantly, both
historically and presently the Constitution has not been interpreted to
mean that businesses that are open to the public have a constitutional
right to discriminate – quite the opposite, in fact.40 As Justice Black
Klansmen and Klanswomen to live their lives as honorable, decent, dignified white people.”).
The Imperial Klans of America are rather more direct: “[i]f you are not of the White race, this web
site is not for the likes of YOU! We reserve the right of free speech to state our views whether our
enemies like it or not. The IKA hates: Muds, spics, kikes and niggers.” Imperial Klans of America,
http://kkkk.net/home.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
The Klan, of course, supports the repeal of nondiscrimination laws. See Ku Klux Klan,
The Knights Party Platform, http://www.kkk.bz/program.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (“Restoring
individual freedom to Christian America.- People should be allowed to hire who they want, live
where they want and practice the Christian faith as they please. Likewise people should be able to
sell to whom they want, rent to whom they want and socialize and conduct business with who they
want. The government should not interfere with the everyday lives of white Christian Americans.”).
38. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts
qualified as an expressive organization because they seek to instill values in youth, and stating: “[t]o
determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment's expressive associational right, we
must determine whether the group engages in „expressive association.‟ The First Amendment's
protection of expressive association is not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come within its
ambit, a group must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private.”).
39. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding denial of taxexempt status to university that had religiously motivated racially discriminatory admissions
policy); id. at 604 (“The governmental interest at stake here is compelling. . . . [T]he Government
has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education discrimination that prevailed, with official approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation's history.
That governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on
petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs.” (footnote omitted)). Cf. Corp. of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (ruling that
the statutory exemption of religious organizations from the federal nondiscrimination law did not
violate the Establishment Clause.).
40. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding 1964 Civil Rights Act
against a family owned restaurant that wished to discriminate on the basis of race); Romer v. Evans,
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stated in Marsh v. Alabama,41 “[t]he more an owner, for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it.”42
10. IS “EQUALITY” UNDER THE CONSTITUTION MEASURED SOLELY BY
REFERENCE TO TRADITION AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY, OR IS IT A
BROADER CONCEPT?
We now reach the issue where Professor Dent and I share a
profound disagreement: the meaning of “equality” under the
Constitution. Professor Dent has written that the principle of equality –
the idea that persons who are alike must be treated alike – is an “empty”
concept that has no inherent meaning.43 On this point I disagree with
him. The principle of equality is not only central to the Constitution, but
is also central to the American identity.
In my opinion, most of the legal and social problems that arise
under the Constitution stem from the belief, held by some people, that
they are better than other people. They do not hate anyone. They
simply believe that they are superior and that the law ought to treat them
better than the other group.44 This is true of whites who think they are
517 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1996) (“At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others who „made
profession of a public employment,‟ were prohibited from refusing, without good reason, to serve a
customer.” (citation omitted)).
41. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (finding the operation of a company town to constitute state action).
42. Id. at 506. See also Colleen Theresa Rutledge, Caught in the Crossfire: How Catholic
Charities of Boston Was Victim to the Clash Between Gay Rights and Religious Freedom, 15 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL‟Y 297, 306-07 (2008) (“When state power to protect the gay population
conflicts with religious organizations' free exercise, the power of the state will change depending on
the zone in which the religious exemption is claimed. For example, the state's regulatory power is
strongest in the zone of commercial affairs. But the religious claim to an exemption is strongest in
the zone of religious activity, such as doctrine and worship.”).
43. See Dent, How Does Same-Sex Marriage Threaten You?, supra note 1, at 234 (“The
notion of equality is notoriously „empty.‟”); Civil Rights for Whom?, supra note 1, at 628 (“Nor
does the principle of equality help. It requires that likes be treated alike, but it does not tell us what
things are alike.”).
44. On December 12, 1953, two months after he had been sworn in as Chief Justice, Earl
Warren presided over his first conference with the other members of the Court in the case of Brown
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superior to blacks, men who think they are superior to women, and
heterosexuals who think they are superior to homosexuals.
People
have often justified each of these beliefs by appeals to religion.45
The Declaration of Independence says that “all men are created
equal,”46 but this principle was not included in the original Constitution
because slavery was there,47 and the two ideas could not coexist.
Abraham Lincoln and his followers believed that we had to bring the
concept of equality into the Constitution,48 and I believe it was this goal

v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In presenting the case for discussion, Warren went
right to the heart of the issue:
[T]he more I‟ve read and heard and thought, the more I‟ve come to conclude
that the basis of segregation and “separate but equal” rests upon a concept of
the inherent inferiority of the colored race. I don‟t see how Plessy and the
cases following it can be sustained on any other theory. If we are to sustain
segregation, we also must do it upon that basis.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 292 (1993). For the same reason, I
believe that the constitutionality of laws denying equal marriage rights to gay and lesbian couples
can be sustained only upon the finding that heterosexual relationships are superior to gay and
lesbian relationships.
45. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment)
(citing “divine ordinance” in support of the proposition that women may not serve as lawyers);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (striking down state law forbidding interracial marriage,
and quoting trial court as stating, “[a]lmighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement
there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did
not intend for the races to mix.”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (“Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical
standards. Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law. See Code Theod. 9.7.6;
Code Just. 9.9.31. See also D. Bailey, Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition 70-81
(1975).”).
It is also common for religious persons and atheists to acknowledge only the negative aspects of
each other‟s worldview. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION 262 (2006) (“[Religion is] a
significant force for evil in the world.”); George W. Dent, Jr., Book Review: The Stillborn God:
Religion, Politics, and the Modern West, by Mark Lilla, 24 J.L. & RELIGION 257, 261 (2008)
(“[A]theist regimes have often been murderous and repressive.”).
46. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. cl. 3 (three-fifths clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (clause
protecting the slave trade for a period of 20 years); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (fugitive slave
clause).
48. The Republican Party platform of 1860 stated that the principles of the Declaration,
including the concept “all men are created equal,” were embodied in the Constitution. See John T.
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that justified fighting the Civil War in which over six hundred thousand
American soldiers died.49 By the time of the Gettysburg Address,
Lincoln had already issued the Emancipation Proclamation,50 and the
“unfinished work” that Lincoln spoke of at the dedication of that
military cemetery, the “great task remaining before us” for which those
honored dead gave “the last full measure of devotion,”51 was to make the
ideal of equality part of our fundamental law. After Lincoln‟s death,
America did so by drafting, adopting, and ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment which says that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person . . .
the equal protection of the laws.”52 As amended, the Constitution
instantiates the idea that all men are created equal.
Here is what Lincoln had to say about the principle of equality
after Stephen Douglas claimed that the phrase “all men are created
equal” did not include blacks:53

Woolley
&
Gerhard
Peters,
The
American
Presidency
Project,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29620; see generally Wilson Huhn, Abraham
Lincoln Was a Framer of the Constitution, WASH. U. L. REV. (Slip Opinions, Mar. 12, 2009),
http://lawreview.wustl.edu/slip-opinions/abraham-lincoln-was-a-framer-of-the-constitution/.
49. See DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN
CIVIL WAR, at xi (2008) (estimating the number of soldiers killed in the Civil War at 620,000).
50. See 6 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 28-30 (Roy
Prentice Basler ed.) (1953), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/ [hereinafter
COLLECTED WORKS] (Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863).
51. Lincoln stated:
The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can
never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated
here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so
nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task
remaining before us- that from these honored dead we take increased
devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotionthat we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain- that
this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom- and that
government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from
the earth.
7 Id. at 22-23 (Gettysburg Address, November 19, 1863).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
53. Douglas had claimed that in declaring “all men are created equal,” the founders “were
speaking of British subjects on this continent being equal to British subjects born and residing in
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I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all
men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. . . .
They defined with tolerable distinctness, in what respects they did
consider all men created equal–equal in “certain inalienable rights,
among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” This they
said, and this meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth,
that all were then actually enjoying that equality . . . . They meant
simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as
fast as circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard
maxim for free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by
all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never
perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly
spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness
and value of life to all people . . . everywhere.54
In this passage Lincoln is telling us that the principle of equality
imposes upon us a task which is always unfinished. To understand
equality we cannot rely solely or even mainly upon existing laws or the
specific understanding of our ancestors, religious teaching, or what our
parents told us in determining who is equal and who is not.55 It is
instead our obligation under the Constitution to constantly look to this
ideal of equality, to constantly labor for it, to constantly reexamine our
own beliefs, our own preconceptions, our own attitudes, to consider and
reconsider and reconsider again whether or not that person or group
whom we thought to be inferior in fact might be our equal. It is this idea
more than any other that Lincoln stood for.56

Great Britain . . . .” 2 COLLECTED WORKS 406 (statement of Stephen Douglas which Lincoln
responded to in his speech of June 26, 1857).
54. Id.
55. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (Kennedy, J.) (“[H]istory and tradition
are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”
(quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
56. In ending slavery, Lincoln did not appeal to custom or tradition. Instead he told the
people of the United States, “[a]s our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must
disenthrall our selves, and then we shall save our country.” 5 COLLECTED WORKS 537 (Annual
Message to Congress, December 1, 1862).
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Gays and lesbians are entitled to equal rights, including equal
marriage rights, because the love that they have for each other is
indistinguishable from the love that heterosexual men and women have
for their partners. Their relationships are just as valuable to themselves
and to society – just as important and just as sacred as the love between
heterosexual couples. In that respect we are all created equal.
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